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The Relation Between Firm-level Corporate Governance and 
Market Value:  A Case Study of India 
By: N. Balasubramanian*, Bernard S. Black† & Vikramaditya Khanna†† 
I.  Introduction 
We know relatively little about the corporate governance practices of public firms in 
emerging markets.  This paper offers two principal contributions.  First, we provide a detailed, “case 
study” of firm-level governance practices in an emerging market, based on a 2006 survey of Indian 
firms.  India is a logical choice for this effort – it is the second largest emerging market based on 
both population and GDP (after China), and the largest emerging market with a significant number 
of non-government-controlled public firms.  We are not aware of comparable efforts in other 
countries, other than a contemporaneous effort by one of us in Brazil, with a smaller sample (Black, 
de Carvalho and Gorga, 2008). 
Second, we contribute to the literature on corporate governance indices and the connection 
between governance and firm market value.  We build a broad overall Indian Corporate Governance 
Index (ICGI) and find a positive association between ICGI and firm market value.  These results are 
broadly consistent with those from multi-country studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and 
Kim, 2005).  However, the multi-country studies cover only the largest firms in each country.   We 
find that the association between ICGI and firm market value extends to, and may be stronger for, 
smaller firms. 
We also investigate the role of particular aspects of governance, such as board structure, in 
predicting firms’ market values.  Some other studies (Dahya, Dimitriev and McConnell, 2008 (cross-
country), Black and Kim, 2008 (Korea)) find a positive association between board structure and firm 
market value.  We do not; see also Black, de Carvalho and Gledson (2008) (negative association in 
Brazil).  Our results thus cast doubt on how much we yet know about what matters in governance.  
The association between an overall index and firm market value, found in a number of individual 
countries as well as in cross-country studies ([cites to come]), breaks down when one investigates 
which aspects of governance underlie the overall relationship.   
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Our findings, especially when combined with those from other countries, suggest that the 
benefits of particular corporate governance practices vary depending on firm and country 
characteristics.  This suggests that governance is not one-size fits all (see also Arcot and Bruno, 
2006; Bruno and Claessens, 2007; Black, de Carvalho and Gorga, 2010).  A combination of some 
mandatory minimum rules (perhaps differing based on firm size) and flexibility above the minimum 
level – for example, by allowing firms to self select levels of governance (as in Brazil) or comply-or-
explain regimes (as in the UK and Continental Europe) -- may prove more valuable than legal 
regimes that rely primarily on mandatory rules.  
Part II summarizes the relevant literature and India's corporate governance history.  Part III 
discusses our survey methodology and data sources.  Part IV discusses survey results.  Part V defines 
a corporate governance index and examines the relationship between index scores and firm market 
value.  Part VI discusses some implications of our study for what matters in corporate governance in 
emerging markets.  Part VII concludes. 
II.  Literature Review 
We review here the literature on two aspects of governance in emerging markets:  what we 
know about governance patterns, and to what extent does governance predict firm share prices or 
performance.  We cover studies of India with care, and other studies in less depth.  We do not cover 
developed countries or nonpublic firms. 
A.  What We Know About Firm-Level Governance in Emerging Markets 
This paper's first goal is to provide a detailed descriptive analysis of firm-level governance in 
an important emerging market.  We know remarkably little about the details of firm-level 
governance.  Cross-country studies of governance provide high level comparisons between countries 
-- for example, mean scores on disclosure (Patel, Balic and Bwakira, 2002) or overall governance 
(Bruno and Claessens, 2010) -- but few details.  Individual country studies report summary statistics 
for overall governance and particular governance measures, but again few details.  To our 
knowledge, the most directly comparable paper is contemporaneous research on Brazil (Black, de 
Carvalho, and Gorga, 2010a; 2010b). 
Several studies examine Indian corporate governance generally.  Khanna (2009) reviews the 
development of corporate governance norms in India from independence to the present.  World 
Bank (2005), Sarkar & Sarkar (2000), and Mohanty (2003) examine how firm-level governance 
influences the behavior of institutional investors, or vice-versa.   Mohanty (2003) finds that 
institutional investors own a higher percentage of the shares of better-governed Indian firms.  This 
is consistent with research in other countries (Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki, 2005; Ferreira and 
Matos, 2007). 
Zattoni, Pedersen and Kumar (2009) and Singh and Gaur (2009) examine the association 
between business group membership and performance with conflicting results.  Jackling & Johl 
study the association between board structure and firm performance in large Indian firms and find 
an association between board size and Tobin’s q, but report only three stage least squares results, 
with unconvincing instruments.  Bhattacharyya and Rao (2005) examine whether adoption of Clause 
49 (an important set of governance reforms in India) predicts lower volatility and returns for large 
Indian firms.  Black & Khanna (2007) conduct an event study of the adoption of Clause 49 and 
report positive returns to a treatment group of large firms (who were required to comply quickly) 
relative to small firms (for whom compliance was delayed), around the first important legislative 
2
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announcement.  Dharmapala and Khanna (2009) report that small Indian firms which are subject to 
Clause 49 react positively to plans by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) -- India's 
securities regulator -- to enforce the Clause, relative to similar firms not subject to Clause 49. 
Other studies of Indian firms are more peripherally related.  Khanna, Kogan and Palepu 
(2006), study instances of minority shareholder expropriation by Indian firms.  Bertrand, Mehta and 
Mullainathan (2002) provide evidence on tunneling within Indian business groups.  Deb and 
Chaturvedula (2004) study the relationship between ownership concentration and firm market value. 
B.  Does Governance Predict Firm Value in Emerging Markets? 
A second goal of this paper is to contribute to the literature on the connection between 
firm-level governance and firm market values in emerging markets.  A number of cross-country 
studies examine this connection (e.g., Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson, 2006; Klapper and 
Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2007;; see also the survey by Love 
(2010).  However, these studies have important weaknesses, including:  they rely on one of two 
available indices, each imperfect;1 they cover only the largest firms in each country; and they have 
limited control variables (which increases the risk of omitted variable bias).   
Individual country studies, such as this one, have different strengths and weaknesses, and 
can complement the cross-country studies.  These studies are of uncertain generalizability.  
However, they allow one to:  (i) study the association between governance and performance at both 
large and small firms; (ii) develop, as we do here, a country-specific governance index which reflects 
a particular country’s rules and norms; (iii) use current indices .  In contrast, the S&P and CLSA 
indices are already becoming dated, and have other important limitations (the S&P index is limited 
to disclosure; CLSA relies in part on analysts' subjective opinions).  The principal studies which 
develop and assess overall governance measures for emerging markets include: 
 Brazil (Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2007; Black, de Carvalho and Gorga, 2010b) 
 Hong Kong (Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom and Zhou, 2007) 
 Korea (Black, Jang and Kim, 2006a) 
 Russia (Black, 2001; Black, Love and Rachinsky, 2006). 
III.  Survey Methodology and Data Sources 
A.  Survey Methodology 
This study relies on an extensive survey we conducted in early 2006 of 506 Indian public 
companies ("India CG Survey 2006").  We received 370 responses (73% response rate).2  We 
surveyed firms with central offices in one of India's six largest cities -- Bangalore, Chennai, 
Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai, and New Delhi.  We approached all firms in the BSE 200 index with 
                                                 
1  These are:  Standard & Poor's transparency and disclosure index (2002; only disclosure); and Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia survey (2001; some questions are subjective; responses could be influenced by firm performance). 
2  A copy of the survey is available on request from the authors.  Most respondents held senior positions at 
their firms (309 were chief legal officer or company secretary; 42 were CFO or other senior finance official; 10 were the 
CEO).  The survey was supported by the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and IIM Bangalore, one of India's top 
business schools.  We mailed a survey to each firm, did followup mailings and phone calls, and engaged the A.C. Nielsen 
survey research firm to visit firms.  The higher response rates for BSE 201-500 firms and non-BSE-500 firms (see Table 
1) could reflect a tendency for A.C. Nielsen to contact firms with whom they had prior relationships.  We promised 
confidentiality to respondents, and thus do not name individual firms in this paper. 
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central offices in these cities; these firms include 26 of the firms in the BSE 30 index and 131 of the 
BSE 200 firms.3  For smaller firms, we asked A.C. Nielsen to select firms at random, with a tilt 
toward firms in the BSE 500 index.  Overall, we approached 275 firms in the BSE 500 (55%); these 
firms represent 80% (76%) of the market capitalization of the BSE 500 (all Indian public firms).  For 
details on the survey questions, see Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna (2009). 
The size and other financial characteristics of approached firms are similar to 
nonapproached firms and those of responding firms are similar to nonresponding firms.  Thus, 
sample selection bias is likely to be limited, relative to all Indian private firms large enough to be 
included in the Prowess financial database (the principal source of financial information for Indian 
firms, similar to a combined Compustat and CRSP for U.S. firms).  We did not study very small 
firms which are publicly listed, but rarely trade and are not covered by Prowess.4 
Table 1 provides summary information on the firms we approached and those which 
responded.  The response rates exceeded 50% for all BSE group ranges. 
Table 1.  Surveyed and Responding Firms 
Number of firms approached and number of respondents in different size ranges, for India CG Survey 2006.  Total row 
includes all firms in Prowess database (database of Indian public firms. 




Responses (% of 
surveyed) 
BSE 30 30 26  (87%) 20 (77%) 
BSE 31-100 70 45  (64%) 26 (58%) 
BSE 101-200 100 61  (61%) 31 (51%) 
BSE 201-500 300 143  (47%) 82 (56%) 
Subtotal BSE 500 500 275  (55%) 160 (58%) 
Other 2,007 231  (15%) 210 (91%) 
Total 2,507 506  (20%) 370 (73%) 
Of the 370 respondents, 31 were government-controlled, 38 were foreign-controlled.5  Our 
analysis below focuses on the remaining 301 firms, which we term "Indian private firms." The 
response rate for these firms was 77% (301/393).   Of these 301 firms, 55% are part of an Indian 
business group which includes one or more other public firms; 69% have a 40% or greater 
shareholder. 
                                                 
3  The standard stock price indices for Indian firms are BSE 30 (also called Sensex); BSE 100, BSE 200, BSE 
500 and, for the National Stock Exchange, the Nifty Fifty.  Most large Indian firms are listed on both exchanges. 
4  Respondents might self-report with bias, but it seems likely that this bias is not severe.  First, a significant 
number of firms do not comply with Indian rules on board independence, which is verifiable from both their annual 
reports and their survey responses.  This suggests that firms do not expect significant consequences from 
noncompliance.  Given this, plus our promise of confidentiality, firms had little reason to misreport to us.  Second, for 
some governance elements, we have data both from annual reports (which are public, hence misreporting may be riskier) 
and from our survey; there are occasional differences between the two sources, but no systematic differences. 
5  We classified as foreign-controlled firms with a majority foreign owner or a 40% foreign owner who held 
more than any other shareholder.  We classified as government-controlled 25 firms which are majority owned by the 
central government or a state government, 5 firms with at least 39% government ownership, and Cement Corp. of India, 
which has missing ownership data.  Prowess classifies all of these firms as government firms.  No firms have between 
11% and 39% government ownership. 
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IV.  Indian Corporate Governance Overview 
This Part provides a detailed overview of the corporate governance of Indian private firms.  
Results are based only on responding firms except as noted.  Balasubramaniam, Black and Khanna 
(2009) provide additional details and citations to the applicable legal rules. 
A.  Board Composition and Independence 
The principal sources of Indian corporate governance rules are the Company Law and 
“Clause 49” of the stock exchange listing requirements, issued by the Indian securities regulator, 
SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India).  Clause 49 requires listed firms with net worth  
greater than Rs. 25 crores (1 crore = 107 rupees ≈ US$200,000) or paid up share capital greater than 
Rs. 3 crores at any time in their history to have either a majority of independent directors, or at least 
1/3 independent directors plus a board chairman who is not the CEO (but need not be 
independent, and often represents the controlling family or business group).  Table 2 provides 
information on board composition.  Larger firms have larger boards (Pearson correlation between 
ln(market capitalization), and board size = 0.20, p < .01). 
Some Indian firms have complained that it can be hard for them to find qualified 
independent directors.  Table 2 suggests that most surveyed firms can find independent directors; 
how qualified, we do not know.   
Table 2.  Percentages of Different Types of Directors 
Sample is 295 firms with board composition data which responded to India CG Survey 2006. 




Separate CEO and chairman 
(for firms in range for 
independent directors) 
0% 7 152 7 2 
1-32% 121 97 13 9 
33-49% 98 31 68 50 
50% 35 4 70 34 
51-74% 31 9 108 67 
75-100% 3 2 29 13 
Total 295 295 295 175 (59%) 
mean (median) % 35% (33%) 12.7% (0%) 53% (50%)  
mean (median) 
number of directors 
2.82 (3) 1.09 (0) 4.35 (4) 
 
The final column of Table 2 shows the number of firms, within a particular range for 
percentage of independent directors, who have separate CEO and chairman.  This practice is 
common; it is followed by 175 (59%) of responding firms.  However, 20 firms (7%) do not comply 
with the requirement of at least 33% independent directors.  In addition, of the 68 firms with 33-
49% independent directors, 18 do not have a separate CEO and chairman; and thus also do not 
comply with Clause 49.  In all, 257 firms (87%) comply with the board independence rules. 
If the independence rules are appropriate (a topic we do not explore here), this level of 
noncompliance could be worrisome.  Yet, in assessing the reliability of survey responses, reports of 
non-compliance may be good news.  That some firms reported not complying with Clause 49 gives 
us more confidence that firms who report complying in fact comply. 
5
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We also asked about director backgrounds.  Clause 49 requires firms to have an audit 
committee, and requires the audit committee to have at least one person with financial or accounting 
expertise; 96% of firms comply.  Over 20% of firms have a director who explicitly represents 
minority shareholders or institutional investors.  There is a fair bit of gender diversity, with 30% of 
firms having a female director (but typically only one). 
Some aspects of firms' choices for directors provide some basis for concern.  One may 
doubt the business expertise of a typical scholar.  Yet 39% of firms turn to scholars to fill the ranks 
of independent directors, and often add several such persons to their boards; the mean number of 
scholar-directors for firms which take this route is 2.6.  A similar percentage of firms have a lawyer 
on the board, but typically only one.  Perhaps reflecting the importance of government regulation 
and political connections, 30% of firms have a former government official or former politician on 
their board.6 
B.  Board Practices and Processes 
We turn next to the survey questions that assess board practices and processes.  These are 
summarized in Table 3, along with an indication of which practices are legally required practices, and 
when the requirement was adopted. 
Indian law allows director terms to be up to 5 years but also requires either (i) annual terms 
or (ii) at least two-thirds of the directors should serve staggered terms, with a 3-year maximum.   
Most firms use multiyear terms for both executive and nonexecutive directors, usually 3 or 5 years 
for executives and 3 years for nonexecutives. 
Indian law requires at least 4 board meetings per year, with no more than 3 months between 
meetings.  All but eight firms met this rule; the median number of physical meetings per year is 6.  
However, three outlier firms reported that their board never met during the year!  Only 11% of 
firms reported sometimes using phone or other electronic meetings, instead of physical meetings.  
Indian law requires firms to prepare minutes for board and board committee meetings.  Almost all 
firms prepare minutes for meetings of board committees. Only 75% said that dissents would be 
recorded in the minutes.  However, some "no" answers could reflect lack of dissents, rather than a 
practice of not recording them. 
                                                 
6 By comparison, Choi, Park and Yoo (2007) report, for Korean directors over 1999-2002 (period of rapid 
change in Korean boards, partly due to legal mandates), the average firm had 32% outside directors; 25% of firms had 
one or more academics as directors; 16% had one or more lawyers, and 13% had one or more former politicians or 
government officials. 
6
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Table 3.  Board Practices and Processes 
Sample is 301 Indian private firms which responded to India CG Survey 2006.  Number of missing or ambiguous 
responses ranges from 0 to 18.  Percentages are of firms with usable responses. 
Characteristic 




Director terms (1956)   
nonexecutive directors have staggered terms  275 (91%)  
executive directors have multiyear terms  261 (92%)  
Board meetings    
Minimum of 4 physical meetings (2001) 293 (98%)  
No. of physical meetings   6.9 (6) 
minutes prepared (1956) 297 (99%)  
Dissents recorded in minutes (1956) 211 (75%)  
Evaluation of CEO and other executives    
regular system for evaluating CEO  151 (51%)  
regular system for evaluating other executives  248 (83%)  
succession plan for CEO  86 (29%)  
annual separate meeting for nonexecutive directors  46 (15%)  
board replaced CEO in last 5 years  0  
Evaluation of nonexecutive directors    





retirement age for nonexecutive directors  44 (15%)  
Director not renominated or resigned due to 





code of conduct (2004) 275 (91%)  
policy restricting insider trading  278 (92%)  
board members typically receive materials at least 









About half of Indian private firms report that they regularly evaluate the CEO; a larger 
number (83%) evaluate other executives.  One wonders, however, how rigorous these evaluations 
are, given that zero firms reported that the board had replaced the CEO in the last 5 years, and only 
three reported replacing other executives!  Perhaps some CEOs were quietly encouraged to pursue 
other opportunities and the respondent did not know the circumstances under which a CEO left.  
Still, Indian CEOs do not appear to be at grave risk of losing their jobs for poor performance.  We 
also asked about the existence of a CEO succession plan; only about 30% of respondents had one.  
Only 15% held an annual board meeting solely for nonexecutive directors. 
Clause 49 includes some recommended items.  One is that firms evaluate the performance of 
nonexecutive directors.  About one-quarter of responding firms report doing so.  Only about 15% 
of respondents had a retirement age for directors.  There were occasional instances – a total of 7 – 
in which a director was not renominated or resigned due to performance concerns or a policy 
dispute.  Here too, reporting could be incomplete, or the respondent may not have known the 
reasons for board turnover. 
7
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Clause 49 requires firms to adopt a code of conduct.  About 90% of respondents have such 
a code; a similar number have a policy restricting insider trading.  A full 96% normally provide 
materials to directors at least one day before board meetings.  However, only 13% comply with the 
Clause 49 recommendation to provide regular director training. 
C.  Audit Committee 
Clause 49 requires firms to have audit committees with at least three members, all 
nonexecutives, an independent chair, and at least one member with expertise in finance or 
accounting.  The committee must meet at least four times per year.  All but three responding firms 
have an audit committee.  Of the firms with a committee, all but three (one) have the required 
number of members (a member with accounting or finance expertise). 
Practice is less uniform on how audit committees operate.  Only 65% of respondents 
reported that the audit committee recommends reappointing or dismissing the external auditor, even 
though Clause 49 requires that the audit committee have this power.  Seventy-nine percent have the 
required 4 meetings per year, but another 18% report having three meetings; only 11 firms report 0-
2 meetings. Only 68% of respondents have a bylaw to govern the audit committee, and at only 72% 
do the independent members meet separately at least once per year.  One lone firm gives minority 
shareholders the power to appoint an audit committee member. 
D.  Compensation of Executives and Nonexecutives 
Table 4 provides information on executive compensation and compensation disclosures.  
For most survey questions, complete responses were the norm, but not for compensation, either 
because respondents lacked the information or chose not to provide it.  Executive compensation is 
modest by U.S. standards.  The mean (median) CEO receives annual cash compensation of 64 (30) 
lakhs (1 lakh = 105 rupees ≈ US$2,000).  Only 16% of Indian private firms use stock options, which 
are the usual road to riches for U.S. executives.  Most option grants are also modest.7 
Indian law requires firms to obtain government approval to pay compensation above – 
generally speaking -- the greater of (i) 5% of net profits for one manager and 10% for all managers; 
or (ii) if the firm doesn't meet the percentage of profits test, between Rs. 9 lakhs for small firms (< 1 
crore in book value of equity) and 24 lakhs for large firms (> 100 crores in book value of equity).  
Executive compensation under clause (ii) must also be approved by shareholders.  Government 
approval to exceed these levels is usually obtainable, but the combination of these levels, desire to 
avoid seeking approval, and the need to obtain approval if over the threshold could all constrain 
executive pay.  Seventeen percent of firms (52/301) obtained government approval. 
Indian law requires companies to disclose the total pay of the CEO and each director.  We 
asked firms about their disclosure, but cannot distinguish between "no" and missing responses.  
Most firms disclose CEO pay (95%), but compliance is lower for the pay of other directors.  Indian 
law requires shareholders to approve the pay of all directors as a group, but does not require 
separate approval of CEO pay.  Oddly, 89% of firms report that shareholders approve CEO pay, 
while only 70% report that shareholders approve the pay of all directors, even though the latter is 
the legal requirement. 
                                                 
7  A back-of-the-envelope estimate:  The median grant to a CEO of 100,000 options might have an implied 
value 100,000 x (typical $2 share price) x (0.40 estimate of option value/share price) = $80,000. 
8
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Table 4.  Executive and Director Compensation 
Sample is 301 Indian private firms which responded to India CG Survey 2006.  Compensation is in lakhs (1 lakh = 105 
rupees ≈ $2,000); options are in thousands of shares.  For compensation, number of usable responses is shown.  For 
disclosure and approval, we cannot distinguish between “no” and missing responses. 
Compensation Required Responses mean (median)
CEO cash compensation  251 64 (30) 
Compensation of all other executives   184 2273 (154) 
Executives receive stock options 49/299 (16%)
Disclosure and Shareholder Approval  Disclosed Approved 
CEO total pay (1956) 286 (95%) 267 (89%) 
total pay of nonexecutive directors (1956) & (2004) 231 (77%) 183 (61%) 
total pay of all directors (1956) & (2001) 267 (89%) 211 (70%) 
E.  External Auditor 
We also asked about auditor independence.  The external auditor provides non-audit services 
at about half of the firms.  When the auditor provides non-audit services, mean (median) fees for 
non-audit services are 18% (10%) of the auditor's total fees.  
Indian law does not require rotation of audit firms, or the engagement partner within an 
audit firm.  Nonetheless, almost half of firms report that their audit firm rotates the partner 
responsible for their account every 5 years.  Auditor dismissal is rare -- only 2 firms noted dismissals 
in the last 5 years.  One firm said the reason was fees charged, the other did not provide a reason. 
F.  Shareholder Rights 
Table 5 summarizes questions related to shareholder rights.  Indian law has required 
companies to allow postal ballots since 1956, yet only 73% do so.  Given that most firms have a 
controlling shareholder, the fraction of shares voted at the most recent annual shareholder is 
surprisingly small, at a mean of only 58%.  This suggests that minority shareholders often do not 
vote.  Yet shareholder resolutions are not uncommon.  About one-sixth of firms had one or more 
resolutions proposed in the last 5 years.   
Indian law provides takeout rights on a sale of control, which require the new controller to 
offer to buy all shares at the price paid for the controlling shares.  We asked whether minority 
shareholders receive takeout rights, but only 21 firms (8%) reported providing these rights.  Possible 
explanations include poor phrasing (we asked whether the firm, rather than the new controller, 
provides the rights), or ignorance of this requirement.  The famously slow Indian judicial system 
limits the effectiveness of shareholder remedies.  A modest number of firms (20 firms, 7%) have 
responded to problems with the courts by providing for disputes with shareholders to be resolved 
by arbitration. 
Under Indian law, shareholders holding 10% of a company's shares can demand that the 
company hold a special shareholder meeting.  This happened at 14 firms (5%) during the last five 
years.  Shareholders can also asked SEBI or a special appellate court, the Companies Appellate 
Tribunal, to investigate oppression by the controlling shareholder, but only one firm reported facing 
9
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such an investigation in the last five years.  Finally, only one firm has issued preferred shares.  Thus, 
Indian firms are not using these shares to avoid the one common share, one vote regime.8 
Table 5.  Shareholder Rights 
Table shows promoter ownership for non-bank Indian private firms (% of responding firms).  Sample is 301 firms 
which responded to India CG Survey 2006 and have ownership data on Prowess.  Number of missing or ambiguous 






shareholders can vote by postal ballot (1956) 218 (73%)  
percentage of shares voted at most recent AGM   58% (60%) 
company had shareholder resolution in last 5 years  52 (17%)  
disputes w. shareholders resolved by arbitration  20 (7%)  





shareholders asked SEBI or Tribunal to investigate 




company has preferred shares  1  
G.  Related Party Transactions 
Related party transactions and other forms of self-dealing by controlling shareholders are a 
significant concern in India.  Most Indian firms have a major, often controlling shareholder.  
Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) report evidence of tunneling within Indian business 
groups. The good news is that 78% of the responding firms have policies requiring RPTs to be on 
arms-length terms.  The less good news is that there are lots of RPTs.  Clause 49 requires the audit 
committee to approve all RPTs and requires the firm to disclose "materially significant" RPTs to 
shareholders.  Ninety-four percent of firms said they reported RPTs to shareholders, but this 
includes some firms which reported having no or negligible RPTs, and thus nothing to disclose. 
When asked to quantify RPTs as a percentage of sales, 67% (20%) of firms with RPTs reported were 
at least 1% (5%) of revenue.  Sixty percent of firms reported that their board reviewed at least one 
RPT in the last year; 36% reported board review of five or more transactions. 
It is one thing to require RPTs to be on arms-length terms, but another to put procedures in 
place to ensure that the policy is adhered to.  Table 6 summarizes approval requirements, separately 
for RPTs with an inside director and with a controller.  Approval by non-conflicted directors is 
uncommon (7-9% of firms require this) and approval by non-conflicted shareholders is rare (1%).  
Thus, approval can often be influenced, and not infrequently dictated, by a controller. 
                                                 
8  Compare Brazil, where many firms issue preferred shares, which are in substance nonvoting common shares, 
to ensure that the control group retains control.  See Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2010b). 
10
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 10 [2010]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art10
…..] Khanna & Black, India Corporate Governance Overview 11 
 11
Table 6.  Approval Requirements for Related Party Transactions 
Sample is 301 Indian private firms which responded to India CG Survey 2006.  We cannot distinguish between “no” and 
missing responses. 







no specific requirement 81 (27%) 102 (34%) 
approval by audit committee 96 (32%) 82 (27%) 
approval by board of directors 212 (70%) 182 (61%) 
approval by shareholders 37 (12%) 44 (15%) 
approval by non-conflicted directors 26 (9%) 20 (7%) 
approval by non-conflicted shareholders 2 (1%) 3 (1%) 
H.  Cross-Listing and Financial Disclosure 
Table 7 summarizes information on cross-listing and financial disclosure.  Cross-listing may, 
depending on the destination exchange, require the firm to provide additional disclosures.  Twenty-
two firms (7%) are cross-listed, some on more than one non-Indian exchange.9  However, only four 
firms are cross-listed on US exchanges (in the US on levels 2 or 3 -- four firms on the New York 
Stock Exchange and none on NASDAQ -- and hence are subject to U.S. reporting requirements and 
the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act..  The rest cross-list on European markets or in the U.S. over-the-
counter market, where they face few disclosure requirements (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2009).  
Only about 7% of firms prepare financial statements that meet U.S. GAAP or International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).   
Table 7.  Financial Disclosure 
Table shows number of Indian private firms (% of responding firms) with a positive response to the indicated ith items.  
Sample is 301 Indian private firms which responded to India CG Survey 2006. 
Question Yes % Yes 
Company has shares cross-listed in another country 22 7% 
If yes, which country:   
UK 12  
Luxembourg 11  
Germany (Frankfurt or Berlin) 10  
U.S. – off exchange 6  
U.S. - New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ 4  
Company provides IFRS or U.S. GAAPfinancial statements 20 6.8% 
Neither SEBI nor the stock exchanges maintains a website containing annual reports or 
financial statements for all listed firms.  Thus, firm websites are an important way that investors can 
obtain this information.  Table 8 summarizes what firms provide.  About 67% provide annual 
financial statements on their website.  About half also post the annual report to shareholders; a 
similar number provide press releases.  About 43% post a notice of an upcoming shareholder 
opinion, but nary a firm announces the meeting results.  Finally, 6% have no website (or have one 
that we could not find). 
                                                 
9  Cross-listing data was provided to us by Kate Litvak (see Litvak, 2007). 
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Table 8. Information on Company Website 
Sample is 301 Indian private firms which responded to India CG Survey 2006.  Number of responses varies from 276 to 
278.  Percentages are of firms with usable responses. 
Information Item Yes % Yes 
Financial information 
annual financial statements 182 67% 
annual report to shareholders 137 50% 
share price information 145 54% 
press releases 154 57% 
notice of upcoming shareholder meetings 137 46% 
results of shareholder meetings 0 0% 
Website not located 18 6% 
I.  Since When? 
We asked firms how long selected governance practices had been in place.  Table 9 
summarizes the responses.  Many governance practices were adopted recently -- especially those 
which recently became legally required.   -- such as having a written code of conduct for directors 
and executives, which became mandatory in 2004.  Similarly, policies on insider trading, on 
recommendation of the external auditor by the audit committee, and RPT disclosure are mostly of 
recent vintage.  Use of stock options is recent as well; only 9 firms used them before 2000. 
In contrast, the practice of separating the positions of CEO and chairman has a long vintage.  
Its current use may partly reflect the Clause 49 rules, under which a firm is permitted to have at least 
33% independent directors if these positions are separated, versus 50% otherwise.  But many firms 
voluntarily separate the two posts, including firms that separated them before Clause 49 was 
adopted, and the 114 firms that have both separation and 50% independent directors (see Table 2). 
Table 9.  Since When Has a Practice Existed 
Sample is 301 Indian private firms which responded to India CG Survey 2006.  For some questions, number of usable 
responses may not sum to firms with practice because some firms did not answer the "since when" question. 
   Since When 
Practice Usable 
responses
Required 2000s 1990s Earlier 
When was company incorporated 298  6 83 209 
Firm has separate CEO and chairman 163  46 57 60 
Firm has system for evaluating CEO 137  71 43 23 
Firm has code of conduct 266 (2004) 246 13 7 
policy restricting insider trading 251  218 37 6 
audit committee recommends auditor 180 (2001) 149 24 7 
executives receive stock options 48  39 7 2 
RPTs must be on arms-length terms 185  111 31 43 
Material RPTs are disclosed to shareholders 224 (2001) 170 31 23 
J.  Government Enforcement 
In some countries, company law is enforced privately or not at all.  In the U.S., for example, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission enforces securities law, but Delaware corporate law is 
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enforced only privately, through suits by shareholders, creditors, or the company itself.  The Indian 
government, in contrast, has a variety of powers under corporate law, including the compensation 
limits noted above, as well as the power to provide relief for oppression or mismanagement, remove 
management, demand a special audit, inspect the company’s accounts, and impose fines for some 
company law violations. 
These powers, however, are rarely exercised.  In the last 5 years the government has 
removed a director or blocked a director from serving at one Indian private firm and one foreign-
controlled firm in our sample, dismissed an executive at one government firm, and ordered a special 
audit at three private firms.  To be sure, powers that are rarely exercised can still be deterrents. 
V.  Is Corporate Governance Associated with Firm Value? 
We turn next to the association between firm-level governance practices and market value.  
We limit the sample to 276 non-bank Indian private firms with data available on Tobin’s q.  We 
construct a broad Indian corporate governance index, and ask whether the index or subindices 
predicts market values.  We use ln(Tobin's q) as our principal measure of market value (we take logs 
to address high-q outliers), and market/book and market/sales in robustness checks. 
Some caveats.  The analysis below uses only cross-sectional data.  Moreover, governance and 
other firm characteristics could be endogenously determined.  We have no instrument for 
governance, so make no claims as to causation.  Also, firm market values reflect trading prices for 
noncontrolling shares, and does not capture any additional value enjoyed by controlling 
shareholders.  Governance changes could produce market value gains for outside investors by 
increasing overall firm value, by reducing the private benefits of control enjoyed by insiders (thus 
transferring value from insiders to outsiders), or both.  We cannot distinguish here between these 
two broad channels.  We discuss in Part VI the extent to which our results might generalize to other 
emerging markets.   
A.  Non-governance Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 10 defines the principal financial and other non-governance variables used in this 
paper, and provides summary statistics.  This data comes principally from Prowess, which is the 
principal source of financial information for Indian firms, analogous to a combination of Compustat 
and CRSP for U.S. firms. 
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Table 10. Non-Governance Variables 
Table describes and provides summary statistics for principal non-governance variables.  Data from Prowess unless otherwise stated.  Share values and balance sheet amounts 
are measured at year end 2005.  Income statement variables are measured for 2005 unless otherwise specified.  R&D/sales, Advertising/sales, exports/sales, PPE/sales, 
CAPEX/sales and EBDIT/sales are assumed to be zero if missing (7-15 firms depending on measure).  Number of observations varies from 276 to 296.  Amounts in crores. 




Estimated [book value of debt + book value of preferred stock + 
market value of common stock]/book value of assets. 
2.26 1.54 1.73 0.32 13.88 
Market-to-Book Ratio Market value/book value of common stock.  We drop 17 firms with 
negative, zero or missing book value of common stock. 
3.21 2.20 9.32 0 149.53 
Book Value of Assets Book value of assets. 905 199 3,134 9.01 42,545 
Market Value of Equity Market value of common stock plus book value of preferred stock. 1,954 261 7,961 3.5 81,737 
Debt/Equity Book value of debt divided by market value of common stock. 1.18 0.72 1.97 0 19.46 
Debt/Assets Book value of debt divided by book value of total assets 1.34 0.66 2.67 0 36.21 
Years Listed Number of years since original listing. 29.72 21 22.34 3 126 
Sales Growth Geometric growth rate from 2003 to 2005 (or available period). 0.35 0.17 1.46 -0.39 21.32 
R&D/Sales Research and development (R&D) expense/sales. 0.002 0 0.013 0 0.17 
Advertising/Sales Ratio of advertising expense to sales. 0.009 0 0.022 0 0.18 
Exports/Sales Ratio of export revenue to sales. 0.232 0.07 0.31 0 1.02 
PPE/Sales Ratio of property, plant and equipment to sales. 0.65 0.40 0.95 0.004 9.89 
Capex/Sales Ratio of capital expenditures to sales. 1.19 0.62 2.58 0.044 36.59 
EBDIT/Sales Ratio of earnings before income and taxes to sales. 0.18 0.15 0.82 -11.71 5.99 
Share Turnover 
Average daily shares traded during 2005/shares held by public 
shareholders 
0.007 0.0023 0.017 0.00001 0.15 
Foreign Ownership Foreign ownership of the firm's common shares divided by 
common shares outstanding. 
8.38 2.92 12.29 0 66.02 
Market Share Firm's share of sales by all firms in same 4-digit industry. 0.02 0.005 0.056 0 0.44 
Cross-Listing Dummy 1 if firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange. 0.08 0 0.27 0 1 
Promoter Ownership Percentage share ownership by promoters. 49.11 49.78 18.47 0 98.19 
Business Group Dummy 1 if a member of a business group, 0 otherwise. 0.53 1 0.50 0 1 
MSCI Dummy 1 if firm included in Morgan Stanley Capital International Index at 
year-end 2004, 0 otherwise.  Source:  MSCI. 
0.03 0 0.17 0 1 
Industry Dummies 10 industry groups, plus "other" category.  Constructed using information from Prowess and company websites.
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B.  Construction of the Indian Corporate Governance Index 
We rely on the survey and firm annual reports to construct an India Corporate Governance 
Index (ICGI).  We identify 49 firm attributes that are often believed to correspond to "good" 
governance, on which we have reasonably complete data, reasonable variation across firms, and 
sufficient difference from another element included in ICGI.  Manifestly, there is judgment involved 
on which elements to include.  Each is coded "1" if a firm has the attribute; "0" otherwise.  We 
group these elements into indices as follows: 
 Board Structure (with subindices for board independence and board committees) 
 Disclosure (with subindices for disclosure substance and for auditor independence) 
 Related Party Transactions (subindices for volume of RPTs and approval procedures) 
 Shareholder Rights 
 Board Procedure (with subindices for overall procedure and for audit committee procedure) 
Table 11 describes the index components.  Within each index, we give equal weight to each 
element.  We normalize each index to mean 0 and standard deviation 1, and sum the normalized 
index scores to obtain an overall ICGI score.  If a firm has a missing value for a particular element, 
we use its average score for the nonmissing values to compute each index.10 
Table 11.  Corporate Governance Index: Elements and Summary Statistics 
Description and summary statistics for elements included in India Corporate Governance Index (ICGI), for 296 private, 
non-bank Indian firms which responded to India CG Survey 2006.  All variables are coded yes=1, no=0.  In "responses" 
column, numerator is number of "1" responses, denominator is total number of responses. 
Label Variable Responses Mean % Responding
Board Structure Index 
Board independence subindex 
BdIn.1 Board contains of at least 50% independent directors 205/290 0.71 98%
BdIn.2 Board contains over 50% independent directors 135/290 0.47 98%
BdIn.3 CEO is NOT chairman of the board 175/296 0.59 100%
BdIn.4 
Compliance with Clause 49:  Either (i) board consists of at 
least 50% independent directors or (ii) board consists of at 
least 1/3 independent directors and CEO is not chairman 
253/290 0.87 98% 
Board committee subindex 
BdCm.1 Audit committee exists, has majority of indep. directors 268/284 0.94 96%
BdCm.2 Compensation committee exists. 213/296 0.72 100%
Disclosure Index 
Disclosure substance subindex 
Di.1 Related party transactions are disclosed to shareholders 270/287 0.94 97%
Di.2 Firm has regular meetings with analysts 185/296 0.63 100%
Di.3 Firm discloses direct and indirect 5% holders 216/294 0.73 99%
Di.4 
No shareholder agreement among controlling shareholders, 
or agreement exists and is disclosed. 
264/270 0.98 91% 
Di.5 Firm puts annual financial statements on web 182/271 0.67 92%
                                                 
10  For Board Independence subindex, three of the four elements require data on number of independent 
directors, which is missing for 6 firms.  We judged that multiplying these firms' scores on the remaining element (CEO 
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Label Variable Responses Mean % Responding
Di.6 Firm puts quarterly financial statements on web 198/271 0.73 92%
Di.7 Firm puts annual report on web 137/273 0.50 92%
Di.8 Firms puts directors’ report on web 143/273 0.52 92%
Di.9 Firm puts corporate governance report on web 148/273 0.54 92%
Auditor independence (disclosure reliability) subindex
Dr.1 Auditor does not provide non-audit services 151/296 0.51 100%
Dr.2 Auditor does not provide non-audit services or non-audit 
fees are < 25% of total auditor fees 
185/296 0.63 100% 
Dr.3 Full board reviews auditor's recommendations 275/290 0.95 98%
Dr.4 Audit partner is rotated every 5 years 120/282 0.43 95%
Related Party Index 
RPT volume subindex 
Re.1 Firm does not have loans to insiders 273/291 0.94 98%
Re.2 Firm does not have significant sales to or purchases from 
insiders 
270/291 0.93 98% 
Re.3 Firm does not rent real property from or to an insider 233/291 0.80 98%
Re.4 Firm had negligible revenue from RPTs (0-1% of sales) 139/209 0.67 71%
Re.5 No RPTs brought to board or audit committee for approval 
in last 3 years 
69/175 0.39 59% 
Re.6 RPTs are on arms-length terms 226/289 0.78 98%
RPT approval subindex 
Ra.1 RPTs with executives approved by board, audit committee or 
shareholders 
219/296 0.74 100% 
Ra.2 RPTs with executives approved by audit committee or non-
interested directors 
97/296 0.33 100% 
Ra.3 Shareholder approval of RPTs with executives 37/296 0.13 100%
Ra.4 RPTs with controlling shareholder approved by board, audit 
committee or shareholders 
197/296 0.66 100% 
Ra.5 RPTs with controlling shareholder approved by audit committee 
or non-interested directors 
84/296 0.28 100% 
Shareholder Rights Index 
Sh.1 Directors serve one year terms 26/296 0.09 100%
Sh.2 Firm allows voting by postal ballot 213/292 0.73 99%
Sh.3 Disputes with shareholders are subject to arbitration 20/266 0.08 90%
Sh.4 Company has policy against insider trading 273/295 0.93 99%
Sh.5 Board has one or more minority shareholder representatives 3/294 0.01 99%
Board Procedure Index 
Overall procedure subindex 
Pr.1 Average board meeting attendance rate ≥ 80% 174/296 0.59 100%
Pr.2 Firm has system to evaluate CEO 146/293 0.50 99%
Pr.3 Firm has system to evaluate other executives 243/293 0.83 99%
Pr.4 Firm has system to evaluate nonexecutive directors 74/292 0.25 99%
Pr.5 Firm has succession plan for CEO 84/288 0.29 97%
Pr.6 Firm has retirement age for nonexecutive directors 41/294 0.14 99%
Pr.7 Directors receive regular board training 39/294 0.13 99%
Pr.8 Firm has annual board meeting only for nonexecutives 46/292 0.16 99%
Pr.9 Board receives materials in advance  285/296 0.96 100%
Pr.10 Nonexecutives can hire own counsel and advisors 172/292 0.59 99%
Pr.11 Firm has code of ethics 269/296 0.91 100%
Audit committee procedure subindex
Pa.1 Firm has bylaws governing audit committee 199/293 0.68 99%
Pa.2 Audit committee recommends external auditor 191/293 0.65 99%
Pa.3 Independent members of committee meet separately 212/292 0.73 99%
16
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Figure 1 shows the overall variation in the index.  One firm with a very low score aside, the 
distribution of ICGI is reasonably symmetric and close to normal. 
Figure 1. Distribution of ICGI 
Fraction of firms with ICGI scores in indicated ranges, plus superimposed normal probability density function.   Sample 
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Table 12, Panel A provides summary statistics on ICGI and its components; Panel B 
provides a correlation table.  There is substantial spread on each index and subindex, and for ICGI 
as a whole.  The mean (median) firm has “1” values for 27.5 (27.8) elements.  The inter-index 
correlations are generally positive but modest, so there is only limited colinearity between indices. 
Table 12. Summary Data for ICGI 
Panel A.  Descriptive statistics for ICGI and components (before normalizing), for 296 private, non-bank Indian firms 








Board Structure Index 4.29 1.36 0 6 6 
Board Independence 2.61 1.19 0 4 4 
Board Committees 1.64 0.57 0 2 2 
Disclosure Index 8.85 2.65 0 13 13 
Disclosure Substance 6.20 2.41 0 9 9 
Disclosure Reliability 2.65 0.89 0 4 4 
Related Party Index 6.66 2.11 0 11 11 
Level of Related Party Transactions 4.67 1.24 0 6 6 
Transaction Approval 2.14 1.55 0 5 5 
Shareholder Rights Index 2.23 0.81 0 4.8 5 
Procedure Index 7.43 2.41 1 14 14 
Board Procedure 5.37 1.95 0 11 11 
Audit Committee Procedure 2.04 0.90 0 3 3 
Non-normalized sum of ICGI components 27.47 4.83 9.0 38.4 49 
ICGI (sum of normalized subindices) 0 2.71 -10.46 6.07  
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Panel B.  Correlations among ICGI and its components. ** and *** indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels.  












ICGI 1      
Board Structure Index 0.54*** 0.20*** 1    
Disclosure Index 0.56*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 1   
Related Party Index 0.53*** 0.19*** 0.089 0.15*** 1  
Shareholder Rights Index 0.46*** 0.10*** 0.044 -0.043 0.060 1 
Board Procedure Index 0.61*** 0.29*** 0.12** 0.19*** 0.15** 0.18*** 
C.  Univariate Association Between Governance and Firm Value 
We next assess the association between ICGI and its components, on one hand, and firms' 
market values, on the other.  Figure 2 provides a scatter plot of ICGI against Tobin's q at year-end 
2005 (shortly before we conducted the survey), plus a regression line from a regression of Tobin's q 
on ICGI plus a constant term.  There is a visually apparent correlation; the simple correlation is 0.26 
and the regression coefficient is 0.064 (t = 4.90). 
We have 276 firms with data on Tobin's q.  In Figure 2 and later regressions we drop 12 
outlier observations, for which a studentized residual from regressing Tobin's q on ICGI is greater 
than 1.96.  This generates a regression sample of 264 firms. 
Figure 2. ICGI (Indian Corporate Governance Index) and Tobin’s q 
Scatter plot of ICGI versus Tobin's q at year-end 2005 for 264 firms with data on Tobin’s q which responded 
to India CG Survey 2006, after dropping 12 outlier observations based on |studentized residual| from 
regression of ln(q) on ICGI  > 1.96.  Highest and lowest 5% of Tobin's q values are included in regression but 
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D.  Association Between Governance and Market Value:  Full Sample Results 
In Table 13, regressions (1)-(3) we regress ln(Tobin's q) against ICGI and control variables.  
In unreported robustness checks, we obtain similar results if we do not drop outliers or keep them 
but winsorize ln(q) at 5% and 95%.  Regressions (4)-(5) report robustness checks with 
ln(market/book) and ln(market/sales) as dependent variables. 
Many firm characteristics can be associated with both Tobin's q and governance.  We 
therefore include a broad array of control variables, to limit omitted variable bias.  We use ln(assets) 
to control for the effect of firm size on Tobin’s q.  In unreported robustness checks, we obtain 
similar results using ln(sales).  We include ln(years listed) as a proxy for firm age, because younger 
firms are likely to be faster-growing and perhaps more intangible asset-intensive, which can lead to 
higher Tobin’s q.  We include leverage (debt/market value of common equity) because it can 
influence Tobin’s q by reducing free cash flow problems. 
We control for firms' growth prospects using geometric average sales growth over 2003-
2005, for capital intensity using (PPE/sales, and for capital expenditures relative to the historical 
capital stock (capex/PPE).  We control for intangible assets using (R&D expense)/sales and 
(advertising expense)/sales.  Because export-oriented firms may be different than other firms, we 
control for exports/sales.  We control for profitability measured by EBDIT/sales.  We control for 
market share in 4-digit industry because it could affect both profitability and product market 
constraints.  We include share turnover (traded shares as a percentage of public float) as a measure 
of liquidity, since share prices may be higher for firms with more easily traded shares.  We include 
promoter ownership as a measure of insider ownership.  We include foreign ownership because 
foreign investors are diversified and may be willing to pay higher prices than domestic investors, 
thus affecting Tobin’s q, may pressure firms to improve their governance, or may invest in better 
governed firms (Ferreira and Matos, 2007).  Since both governance and Tobin’s q may reflect 
industry factors, we include industry dummies.11  We include a business group dummy because 
business group firms may have political connections, access to financing, or be more diversified, 
which could affect Tobin’s q (Zattoni, Pedersen and Kumar, 2009; Singh and Gaur, 2009).  We 
include a cross-listing dummy, which can proxy for foreign investor interest, liquidity, and enhanced 
disclosure, and a dummy variable for a firm's inclusion in the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
Index for East Asia, which may proxy for liquidity and price pressure due to index fund purchases. 
In regression (1), the only independent variables are ICGI and industry dummies.  Including 
these dummies reduces the coefficient on ICGI from 0.064 (Figure 1) to 0.057.  As we add 
additional control variables in regressions (2) and (3), the coefficient on ICGI declines to 0.034, 
indicating the importance of a good set of control variables.  However, ICGI remains statistically 
significant (t = 2.75) and economically meaningful.  A one standard deviation (2.71 point) increase in 
ICGI predicts an 0.093 increase in ln(Tobin's q), or about a 17% increase in share price for a firm 
with median Tobin's q (1.54) and median debt/total assets (0.66).12 
                                                 
11  Following Black and Khanna (2007), we construct 15 industry groups, of which 11 are represented in our 
sample.  The industries (number of firms) are:  agriculture and manufacturing (151); chemicals (42); services (25); 
computer (20); finance (15); construction (10); trade (9); metals (8); transportation (7); energy (2); and other (7). 
12  Tobin’s q = (debt/assets) + (market value of equity/assets).  A shock to share price affects only the second 
term:  Let T be the fractional increase in Tobin's q and S be the fractional share price increase.  S = {[New (market 
equity/assets)]/[Old (market equity/assets)] -1} = {[New q - (debt/assets)]/[Old q - (debt /assets)] - 1} = {[(Old 
q)*(1+T) - (debt/assets)]/[Old q - (debt /assets)] - 1}.  This equation can be solved for S if we know debt/assets, old q, 
and the fractional change T. 
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Table 13. OLS for Corporate Governance Index with Different Control Variables 
Ordinary least squares regressions of ln(Tobin's q), ln(market/book), and ln(market/sales) on ICGI and control variables.  
We drop 12 outlier observations, based on |studentized residual| from regressing dependent variable on ICGI > 1.96.  
*, **, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  t-values, based on White's heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors, are in parentheses.  Significant results (at 5% or better) are shown in boldface.   
Dependent variable Ln(Tobin's q) Ln(market/book) Ln(market/sales)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ICGI 
0.0565*** 0.0563*** 0.0342*** 0.0322** 0.0400**
(4.10) (3.96) (2.75) (1.97) (2.11)
Ln(assets) 
 -0.00578 -0.0957*** -0.0874** -0.076
 (0.18) (2.75) (2.05) (1.39)
Ln(years listed) 
 0.0616 0.0662 0.1262* 0.042
 (1.08) (1.23) (1.89) (0.55)
Debt/Equity 
 -0.0354 -0.00928 0.084*** -0.0615
 (1.30) (0.41) (2.93) (1.04)
Sales Growth 
 0.0528** 0.0327* 0.0468** 0.0424
 (2.39) (1.65) (2.11) (1.15)
R&D/Sales 
 11.08*** 9.660*** 16.744*
 (4.18) (3.63) (1.77)
Advertising/Sales 
 5.134** 5.402*** 5.16**
 (2.43) (2.65) (2.17)
Exports/Sales 
 -0.195 -0.248 0.297
 (1.52) (1.48) (0.17)
PPE/Sales 
 -0.136** -0.0941 -0.0007
 (2.16) (0.93) (0.01)
Capex/PPE 
 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0003
 (0.61) (0.53) (0.73)
EBDIT/Sales 
 1.395*** 0.9846** 2.352***
 (3.97) (2.54) (4.92)
Market Share 
 1.317 1.969** -0.309
 (1.65) (2.31) (0.27)
Share Turnover 
 2.740* 1.607 4.752**
 (1.79) (0.90) (2.45)
Foreign Ownership 
 0.0125*** 0.0133*** 0.017***
 (3.65) (3.54) (4.00)
Promoter Ownership 
 0.0005** 0.0059** 0.006**
 (2.18) (2.28) (2.07)
Business Group Dummy 
 -0.071 0.063 0.0001
 (0.83) (0.62) (0.00)
Cross Listing Dummy 
 0.314** 0.216 0.455***
 (2.39) (1.14) (2.78)
MSCI Dummy 
 0.254 0.296 0.273
 (1.40) (1.35) (1.29)
Intercept Term Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 264 254 250 255 260
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.095 0.291 0.278 0.540
Several control variables are significant and generally remain so with the alternate dependent 
variables.  Larger firms have lower valuations.  Firms which are intangible asset intensive, proxied by 
advertising/sales and R&D/sales, have higher valuations.  More profitable firms have higher 
valuations, as do firms with higher ownership by the controlling shareholder or group and higher 
foreign ownership.  In unreported regressions, we add interactions between ICGI and the significant 
control variables; none of the interaction terms are significant. 
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E.  Subindex Results 
We next examine which subindices are associated with ln(q). Table 15, regression (1) reports 
results if we include all five subindices as separate independent variables, in a regression otherwise 
similar to our "full controls" specification (Table 13, regression (3)).  In robustness checks, we 
obtain similar results for each subindex by itself.  In regression (1), Shareholder Rights Index is 
positive and marginally significant.  Shareholder rights also seems to drive the association between 
ICGI and firm value for more profitable firms (regression (4)).  The coefficients on Board Structure 
and Disclosure Indices in the full sample regression (1) are positive but insignificant.  The 
coefficients on Board Procedure and Related Party Transactions are close to zero. 
Table 15.  OLS Results for Subindices 
Ordinary least squares regressions of ln(Tobin's q) on ICGI and each subindex.  Control variables and sample are the 
same as in Table 13, regression (3), and regressions are similar, except that we replace ICGI with five subindices as 
separate variables.  t-values, based on White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, are reported in parentheses.  
Adjusted R2 varies from 0.153 to 0.371.  *, **, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Significant 
results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface. 
















(1) All firms 250 
0.044 0.061 0.003 0.062* 0.005
(1.22) (1.46) (0.09) (1.89) (0.15)
(2) BSE 500 firms 92 
0.046 -0.005 -0.051 0.062 -0.058
(0.64) (0.06) (0.73) (0.93) (0.72)
(3) non-BSE 500 firms 158 
0.072* -0.010 0.059 0.042 -0.019
(1.75) (0.22) (1.41) (1.20) (0.42)
(4) More profitable firms 
(ROA>15%) 
129 
-0.004 0.041 0.036 0.130** 0.063
(0.07) (0.56) (0.56) (2.37) (1.01)
((5) High Ln(Tobin's q) 128 
0.025 0.061 0.064 0.042 -0.013
(0.58) (1.56) (1.50) (1.11) (0.31)
The weak results for Board Structure Index should be compared to the significant negative 
coefficient on a similar index in Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2010b)’s study of Brazil, the positive 
coefficient in Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell’s (2008) multi-country study, and the strong positive 
coefficient on a similar index in Black and Kim (2010).  If we divide Board Structure Index into 
Board Independence and Board Committee subindices, Board Independence subindex is not 
significant; Board Committee subindex is positive and marginally significant (coefficient = 0.062, t = 
1.75).  We also varied the definition of Board Independence subindex, with similar results.  One 
reason why board independence is not strongly associated with market value is that India's minimum 
requirements for board independence are strict enough so that overcompliance (which provides the 
only variation we can test) does not predict firm value. 
F.  Subsample Results 
We also divide the sample into various subsamples, and rerun the "full controls” 
specification from Table 13, regression (3).  As Table 14 reports, ICGI predicts higher Tobin’s q for 
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more profitable firms, but not for less profitable firms.13  However, if we use a different 
specification, in which we add an interaction between ROA and ICGI to Table 13, regression (3), the 
interaction term is small and insignificant.  We found no strong differences in the coefficient on 
ICGI for large versus small, high versus low growth, manufacturing versus non-manufacturing, and 
business group versus non-group subsamples. 
Table 15. OLS Results for Subsamples 
Ordinary least squares regressions of ln(Tobin's q) on ICGI for subsamples.  Control variables and sample are the same 
as in Table 14, regressions (3)-(4).  Sample is divided at the sample median.  t-values, based on White's 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels.  Significant results (at 5% or better) are shown in boldface. 
Dependent variable Ln(Tobin’s q) Ln(Market/Book) 
 Sample (for 
ln(q)) 
ICGI Other Controls Adjusted R2 ICGI 





More profitable firms 





Less profitable firms 
(Return on assets < 14.85%) 121 
0.012
Yes 0.188 0.013 
(0.66) (0.56) 
G.  Endogeneity Concerns 
Tables 14 and 15 provide evidence that firm-level governance is associated with higher 
ln(Tobin's q).  We cannot assess causation because we have only cross-sectional data, and no 
plausible instrument for governance.  But we can say at least a little bit about the likelihood that our 
results may provide decent guides to causation. 
For emerging markets, little is known about the extent to which reverse causation (with 
better performance leading to better governance) or "optimal differences," in which governance 
optimally differs across firms, make cross-sectional results unreliable in assessing causation (Arcot 
and Bruno, 2006).  For Korea, Black and Kim (2009) find weak evidence of reverse causation in 
Korea.  Black, Jang and Kim (2006) report that firm characteristics, other than firm size, only weakly 
predict Korean firms’ governance choices.  This suggests that endogeneity due to firms’ optimally 
choosing governance to reflect firm characteristics may not be a large concern. 
We cannot assess the likelihood of reverse causation with our dataset.  However, if 
governance were sensitive to a firm's circumstances, we might expect financial and ownership 
characteristics to predict governance.   In unreported regressions, we assess whether the control 
variables used in Tables 14 and 15 predict firms' governance choices.  Ln(assets), sales growth, and 
profitability predict higher ICGI scores.  However, regardless of which independent variables we 
use, adjusted R2 values are negative (and become more so as we add more control variables).  This is 
consistent with the Black, Jang and Kim (2006) results for Korea, and suggests that the optimal 
differences flavor of endogeneity may be a limited concern in India as well. 
                                                 
13  Compare Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2010b), who report that a Brazil governance index predict higher 
Tobin’s q for both more profitable and less profitable firms, with similar coefficients; and Hutchinson and Gul (2004), 
who report that governance is more important for Australian firms with high growth opportunities. 
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VI.  Implications for Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
In this part, we combine our findings with those from other “case studies” of emerging 
markets.  We seek to draw an overall picture of what corporate governance elements emerge as 
important across countries.14  Our conclusions are tentative,, for several reasons.  First, endogeneity 
is an important concern.  Yet most studies, including this one, rely on cross-sectional associations, 
so their results may not be robust.  Time-series studies are preferable, but are still vulnerable to 
endogeneity concerns (e.g., Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2008).  Second, different studies use different 
governance indices.  The “shareholder rights” measure in one study may map only loosely onto the 
similarly named measure in another study.  Third, different countries have different regulatory 
minima, which affect the elements on which there is within-country variation, and the range of that 
variation. 
Generalizing turns out to be difficult.  Most studies find an association between a 
governance measure and Tobin’s q, but Connolly, Limpaphayom and Nagarajan (2008, Thailand) do 
not, at least without extensive digging.  Which governance elements predict higher firm value also 
varies across countries.  This suggests that flexibility in governance rules, above a regulatory 
minimum, would be valuable. 
Board structure and outside directors.  There is evidence that the combination of a minimum 
number of outside directors and an audit committee staffed principally by outside directors can be 
valuable, at least for larger firms.  Black and Kim (2008) and Choi, Park and Yoo (2007) so find in 
Korea, and Black and Khanna (2007) find evidence that India’s Clause 49 reforms, which were 
largely concerned with board structure and audit committees, raised the value of large firms relative 
to smaller firms.  In this study, we find that board structure is positive and marginally significant for 
non-BSE-500 firms, but not for larger firms.  These weak results could partly reflect the fairly high 
regulatory floor set by Clause 49. 
Disclosure.  There is also evidence that better disclosure predicts higher firm value.  Black, 
Kim, Jang and Park (2009) so find for Korea, with firm fixed effects, as do Black, Love and 
Rachinsky (2006) for Russia, again with firm fixed effects, and Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom and 
Zhou (2007) for Hong Kong in cross-section.  We find a positive and marginally significant 
coefficient on disclosure for non-BSE 500 firms. 
Shareholder rights.  There is mixed evidence on whether a package of shareholder rights can 
predict higher firm value.  Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom and Lu (2009) so find for mainland China, 
with firm fixed effects, as do we for India in cross-section.  However, Cheung, Connelly, 
Limpaphayom and Zhou (2007) find an insignificant negative coefficient on the same measure of 
shareholder rights in cross-section in Hong Kong, and Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2009) find an 
insignificant, negative coefficient on a shareholder rights measure in Korea with firm fixed effects. 
Related party transactions.  There is mixed evidence on whether direct controls on related party 
transactions predict higher firm value.  Black, Love and Rachinsky (2006) so find for Russia with 
firm fixed effects, but we find no significant effect for India in cross-section.  However, part of the 
                                                 
14  The other research we draw on includes Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2009, Korea); Choi, Park and Yoo 
(2007, Korea directors); Black & Kim (2008, Korea directors); Black & Khanna (2007, India); Dharmapala and Khanna 
(2009, India); Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom and Zhou (2007, Hong Kong); Black (2001, Russia); Black, Love and 
Rachinsky (2006, Russia); Desai, Dyck and Zingales (2007) (Russia, tax enforcement) Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom and 
Lu (2009, China); Connolly, Limpaphayom and Nagarajan (2008, Thailand); Litvak (2007, effect of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
on cross-listed firms). 
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value added by independent directors may involve better control of related party transactions, so 
that even if they occur, they are less adverse to minority shareholders.  Black and Kim (2008) find 
evidence of this for Korea with firm fixed effects .  This indirect effect of governance on related 
party transactions would be captured by a board structure measure, rather than the related party 
transactions measure. 
Board and committee procedures.  Board and committee procedures are easy to measure, but there 
is as yet no good evidence that they predict firm value.  Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2009) find an 
insignificant coefficient on a board procedures measure in Korea with firm fixed effects, as do we 
for India in cross-section. 
Ownership parity.  Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2009) find evidence for Korea, with firm fixed 
effects, that a measure of “ownership parity” (whether the largest shareholder has equal voting and 
economic rights) predicts higher firm value.  A number of cross-country studies also find that higher 
ownership parity predicts higher firm value (e.g., Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, 2002). 
Firm size, profitability, and growth opportunities.  It is plausible that large firms need different 
governance structures than small firms.  Our results support this proposition – the overall 
association between ICGI and Tobin’s q is driven by the non-BSE 500 firms in our sample.  On the 
other hand, Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2009) report similar results for large and small firms.  We 
also find that the association between ICGI and Tobin’s q is present for high-profit (but not low 
profit) firms, and for firms with high Tobin’s q, which proxies in part for growth opportunities (but 
not low-q firms). 
Our results for subsamples based on firm size and Tobin’s q are consistent with the 
arguments that firms with greater need for external capital benefit more from governance reform 
(Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Durnev and Kim, 2005).  Other studies do not examine subsamples 
divided in these ways; doing so could be a fruitful avenue for future research. Our results suggest 
that one-size does not fit all in governance, which implies that there should be room for firms to 
tailor governance to their own characteristics.   
Inter-firm differences.  Minimum mandatory rules can be valuable in some instances (Black and 
Khanna, 2007 (India); Black and Kim, 2008 (Korea)).  At the same time, the benefits of “better” 
governance depend in part on firm characteristics.  Moreover, governance regulations can 
sometimes impose larger costs than benefits.  The U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act offers an example, both 
for U.S. firms and cross-listed foreign firms (Litvak, 2007; Zhang, 2009). 
One response to inter-firm variation would be a relatively low regulatory floor, which 
mandates only governance structures that are likely to benefit all or most firms.  Another would 
involve a comply-or-explain corporate governance code, of the sort used in the UK (see Arcot and 
Bruno, 2006) and a number of other countries.  India is considering a proposal to allow greater 
customization of corporate governance rules in the form of the Indian Companies Bill 2008.  This 
flexibility could well prove to be beneficial. 
Cross-country differences.  Different countries may have different corporate governance needs.  
For example, the mean and median Tobin's q's for our sample are over 2 (see Table 4).  This 
suggests a combination of strong growth prospects for most firms and investors not expecting a 
high level of tunneling.  In contrast, mean and median Tobin’s q levels are much lower in the other 
countries for which we have similar case study evidence, and are below 1 in Korea (Black, Kim, Jang 
and Park, 2009) and in the early years of the Russia study by Black, Love, and Rachinsky (2006), and 
are often a small fraction of 1 (suggesting high tunneling risk) in Black’s (2001) study of Russian 
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firms in 1999.  This suggests that the core corporate governance problems may be different, either in 
kind or in intensity, across countries, and may call for different remedies. 
Public enforcement.  Dharmapala and Khanna (2009) provide evidence supporting the value of 
sanctions against Indian firms which did not comply with India’s governance rules, and against their 
directors.  This effect was found even though the change in official sanctions, which occurred in 
2004, was not then (or since) followed by imposition of actual sanctions.  Compare Bhattacharya 
and Daouk (2002, 2006), who report that enforced insider trading laws affect firm valuation, but 
unenforced laws do not.  Desai, Dyck and Zingales (2007) provide evidence from Russia that 
enforcement of corporate income tax laws can benefit minority shareholders by limiting cash-flow 
tunneling.   
VII. Conclusion 
We provide a detailed descriptive account of the governance practices of Indian public firms.  
Most firms meet the board independence rules under Indian law, which require either 50% outside 
directors or 1/3 outside directors and a separate CEO and board chairman, but 13% (38 firms) do 
not.  The board chairman often represents the controlling business group or other controlling 
shareholder.   Firms are more likely to comply with audit committee requirement, although 1% do 
not.  Related party transactions are common (67% of firms have RPTs representing 1% of more of 
revenues), but approval requirements for them are often weak.  For transactions with a controlling 
shareholder, only 7% (1%) of firms require approval by non-conflicted directors (minority 
shareholders).  However, 78% of firms nominally require RPTs to be on “arms-length” terms, and 
94% disclose them to shareholders.  Only about 2/3rds of firms provide annual reports on their 
websites.  For those which do not, there is no good alternate source.  Executive compensation is 
modest by US standards, but CEOs face only a small risk of dismissal.  Only about 75% of firms 
allow voting by mail, even though this has been legally required since 1956.  Government 
enforcement actions against firms are almost nonexistent. 
We also contribute to the literature on corporate governance indices and the connection 
between governance and firm value.  We build a broad Indian Corporate Governance Index (ICGI) 
and examine the association between ICGI and firm market value.  We find a positive and 
statistically significant association between ICGI and firm market value in India.  This is consistent 
with prior research in other countries and in cross-country studies.  The association is more 
significant for more profitable firms and firms with higher growth opportunities.  A subindex for 
shareholder rights is individually significant, but subindices for board structure, disclosure, board 
procedure, and related party transactions are not significant.  The non-results for board structure 
contrast to other recent studies, and suggest that India's legal requirements are sufficiently strict so 
that overcompliance does not produce valuation gains. 
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